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Abstract 
Text CAPTCHA has been an effective means to protect online systems from spams and abuses 
caused by automatic scripts which pretend to be human beings. However, nearly all the Text 
CAPTCHA designs in nowadays are based on English characters, which may not be the most user-
friendly option for non-English speakers. Therefore, under the background of globalization, there 
is an increasing interest in designing local-language CAPTCHA, which is expected to be more 
usable for native speakers. However, systematic studies on the usability of localized CAPTCHAs 
are rare, and a general procedure for the design of usable localized CAPTCHA is still unavailable. 
Here, we comprehensively explored the design of CAPTCHAs based on Chinese characters from 
a usability perspective: cognitive processes of solving alphanumeric and Chinese CAPTCHAs are 
analyzed, followed by a usability comparison of those two types of CAPTCHAs and the evaluation 
of intrinsic design factors of Chinese CAPTCHAs. It was found that Chinese CAPTCHAs could 
be equally usable comparing with alphanumeric ones. Meanwhile, guidelines for the design of 
usable Chinese CAPTCHAs were also presented. Moreover, those design practices were also 
summarized as a general procedure which is expected to be applicable for the design of 
CAPTCHAs based on other languages. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
Since its invention in 2002, CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell 
Computers and Humans Apart) has been an effective means to defend automatic scripts and protect 
online systems from spam and abuse, particularly in registration and password verification scenes 
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[1, 2]. For instance, CAPTCHA has been deployed by Gmail and Facebook to filter out fake 
registrations and/or defend violent crack of user passwords. Also, PayPal and online banking 
systems utilize it to enforce financial security for their clients. Principally, a well-designed 
CAPTCHA is easy for human to recognize while hard for bots to crack. In nowadays, CAPTCHAs 
employed by online systems are mainly based on Image or Text [3]. For Image CAPTCHAs, a set 
of images are presented each time and the user is instructed to click on particular image(s) to solve 
them [4]. A typical Text CAPTCHA usually includes several alphanumeric characters (a-z, A-Z, 
0-9) that are distorted and added with background noises to reduce its possibility of being 
recognized by computer algorithms [5]. Given that this paper focuses on Text CAPTCHA, the 
word CAPTCHA mentioned afterwards represents only the text one unless otherwise specified.  
During the verification process, human users are required to correctly input the characters appeared 
on a CAPTCHA [6]. However, with the increased distortion of texts and background, it is more 
efficient to defend automatic scripts [5]  but also at the cost of degraded usability. Therefore, 
several studies have been conducted to investigate the usability of alphanumeric CAPTCHAs: 
Chellapilla [7] presented the limits of distortions that are acceptable for users, which is a 
comprehensive large-scale evaluation of the design factors; Elie Bursztein [8] investigated the 
effects of visual features, anti-segmentation features, and anti-recognition features on the usability 
of CAPTCHAs. Lee [9] found that the usability of CAPTCHA varies with the age of users and the 
young group performed better than the old group. Belk [10] revealed that the participant’s 
cognitive styles also affect the usability of a particular CAPTCHA and they suggested that users’ 
cognitive styles and culture backgrounds should be considered when designing CAPTCHAs. 
 
In addition to those usability studies on alphanumeric CAPTCHAs, there is also an increasing 
importance to design localized CAPTCHAs that use regional languages due to the large number 
of online users who are non-English speakers. Meanwhile, people are also intuitively comfortable 
with their native languages. Localized CAPTCHAs could have several advantages: (i) Familiar for 
local users: it is intuitively more comfortable with native languages and a better usability would 
be expected; (ii) More durable with design factors: for local languages that are complex in form, 
it may not be easily confused with security features such as distortion or background noises; (iii) 
More candidate characters and better security: there are 26 letters and 10 numbers for alphanumeric 
CAPTCHAs, however, take Chinese Language for example, it can easily provide thousands of 
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different candidate characters, which is expected to provide better security because of the 
complexity of various characters. For instance, Shirali-Shahreza [11] designed a CAPTCHA 
mechanism that employs Persian/Arabic characters. Yang [12] explored the application of Korean 
characters in CAPTCHAs, and found they are easier for native Korean speakers. Banday [13] 
investigated the possibility of developing CAPTCHAs based on Urdu, one of the regional 
languages used in India. Accompanying with the deployments of Chinese characters by some 
leading internet companies, such as Baidu.com and Renren.com, there is also an emerging interest 
in developing new algorithms for the generating of Chinese CAPTCHAs. Wang [14] proposed 
double-layer Chinese CAPTCHAs against OCR (Optical Characters Recognition), and a couple of 
other methods for the generation of Chinese CAPTCHAs are also reported [15-17].  
 
However, those previous studies are mostly focused on new means of generating localized 
CAPTCHAs while lack systematical investigations on the usability of such localized CAPTCHAs. 
Particularly, the general procedure for designing localized CAPTCHAs is still unavailable yet. In 
this study, taking the usability investigation of Chinese CAPTCHAs as a case study, we analyzed 
the cognitive processes of solving English and Chinese CAPTCHAs, compared the usability of 
CAPTCHAs based on English and Characters, and explored the intrinsic factors that may affect 
the usability of Chinese CAPTCHAs. Such comprehensive practices on Chinese CAPTCHA were 
further generalized as a standard procedure, which is expected to be applicable for the localization 
of CAPTCHAs based on any other regional languages. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Part II summarized related works on the design of 
localized CAPTCHAs; Part III and Part IV introduced the two experimental designs; Part V 
presented and discussed the experimental results; Part VI proposed a generalized procedure for the 
localization of CAPTCHAs; Part VII presented the conclusion. 
 
 
Ⅱ. Related Work 
Previous works mainly focused on the design of localized CAPTCHAs. For example, Shirali-
Shahreza [11] designed a CAPTCHA that employed Persian/Arabic characters, which are widely 
used by all Muslim communities and usually complex due to the difference of letter size, lack of 
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space between words, variation of formats, etc. Their study indicated that, integrating those 
inherent complexities with random noises and backgrounds, it can hardly be recognized by 
commercial Arabic OCR (Optical Characters Recognition) software and is therefore secure. 
Meanwhile, user study demonstrated a high recognition rate of 90% for human beings. Yang [12] 
explored the application of Korean syllables in text CAPTCHAs, in which each character was 
rotated, split, distorted and combined with a background image that contained random lines and 
special effects. They concluded that such a design is secure and effective for Korean users. Fidas 
[18] compared the solving time and correction rate of text CAPTCHAs using English and non-
English Characters. Their study implied that, for native speakers, the correction rate of native-
language CAPTCHAs is better than that of English ones, while the solving time are similar for 
CATPCHAs based on both languages. Banday [13] investigated the deployment of CAPTCHAs 
based on Urdu, one of the regional languages used in India. Their preliminary results indicated 
that, for native speakers of Urdu who had little or no familiarity with English, they solved Urdu 
CAPTCHAs significantly faster and more accurately than those based on English.  
 
The studies of CAPTCHAs based on Chinese are mainly focused on enhancing security issues.  
For instance, To hack the touclick Chinese CAPTCHA, Shen [19] developed an algorithm utilizing 
multi-scale Corner based Structure Model, which is efficient to capture the structure of Chinese 
characters. Wang [14] proposed a design which incorporated a semi-transparent layer of Chinese 
characters as the background of main layer and experimentally proved that it is effective against 
OCR. Chen [15] proposed a Chinese CAPTCHA model based on AJAX. In such a design, users 
are required to follow the randomly generated natural language instructions and partially input the 
characters shown on a CAPTCHA. This design turned out to be usable while more secure.  
 
Ⅲ. Experimental Design 
The usability was evaluated by three independent variables [20]: effectiveness, efficiency and 
satisfaction. The effectiveness and efficiency were measured by the average solving time and 
correction rate for each type of CAPTCHA, respectively. The satisfaction was obtained through 
an online questionnaire and face-to-face interview with each participant. The first part of this 
section discussed the theoretical analysis: the cognition process of solving CAPTCHAs based on 
English and Chinese characters. The second part introduced the common features of generating 
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CAPTCHAs, such as distortion, overlapping, noise level, etc. The third part focused on 
Experiment I: comparing the usability of English and Chinese CAPTCHAs. The fourth part 
detailed Experiment II, which took into account the findings in Experiment I to evaluate the 
intrinsic factors that may affect the usability of Chinese CAPTCHAs.  
 
3.1. Cognition process of solving English and Chinese CAPTCHAs 
The cognition process of solving CAPTCHAs by a standard keyboard generally involves three 
steps: visual input, information processing and action, which is summarized in Fig. 1. For 
CAPTCHAs that require to input English characters, the solving process is straightforward because 
all letters and numbers are explicitly arranged on a standard keyboard. Therefore, after visual 
caption of an English CAPTCHA, one would recognize each individual character, recall the 
correspondent locations of keys, and finally strike the correspondent keys.   
 
Fig. 1. Cognition process toward solving English and Chinese CAPTCHAs with standard keyboard. 
 
However, the typing of Chinese characters is different from that of English because it is a non-
alphabetic language. For the input of Chinese CAPTCHAs, a coding system, Pinyin, is generally 
used to represent tens of thousands of Chinese Characters with only 26 alphabets. The Pinyin of a 
character is essentially the phonetic symbol of that character and it is mastered by any native 
speakers. Given that each Chinese character is labeled with the combination of serval English 
letters based on the pronunciation of that character, it is quite often that the same alphabetic 
 - 6 - 
 
combination usually corresponds to several Chinese characters. Therefore, the Pinyin input method 
generally involves selecting from several candidate characters. As shown in Fig. 2, take the Pinyin 
“tong” for example, several candidate characters are presented for selection. Although the input of 
Chinese character involves more steps, it is actually very efficient for native speakers because of 
the intensive daily usage of Pinyin. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Demonstration of Microsoft Pinyin, a popular input method of Chinese Characters and also the input method 
used in this study. The keyboard input of this demonstration is “tong” and nine candidate Chinese characters are 
listed in the frame below and labeled with numbers for making a selection. Another nine candidate characters will be 
presented though pressing “Page Up” or “Page Down” on a keyboard. 
 
3.2. Generation of CAPTCHAs 
The CAPTCHAs in this study were generated through the revision of Securimage [21], a widely-
used open source code. Besides the characters used in each CAPTCHA, all other design factors 
were kept the same. For instance, each CAPTCHA was 230 pixels in width and 70 pixels in height. 
The font size was the same for all designs and the font family was Microsoft Yahei unless 
otherwise specified, which supports both English and Chinese characters. The transparency of 
characters displayed on each CAPTCHA were set as 25%. Each CAPTCHA includes 3 random 
lines and the background noise levels, and the distortion of each character were also kept the same 
for all CAPTCHAs. Furthermore, although each English CAPTCHA included 8 letters while the 
Chinese one included 3 or 4 Chinese characters, the averaged keystrokes [22] required for their 
inputs were the same under current experimental setting. Therefore, it maintained a similar 
workload to input different CAPTCHA types and provided a similar condition to evaluate the 
solving time of different designs. 
 
3.3. Experiment I: usability comparison between English and Chinese CAPTCHAs. 
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Fig. 3.  Illustration of CAPTCHA styles explored in the usability comparison of English and Chinese in current 
study: (a) Random English Characters (REC); (b) Frequent English Word (FEW); (c) Random Chinese Characters 
(RCC); (d) Frequent Chinese Word (FCW). 
 
The usability comparison was performed under a similar design frame, in which the only difference 
is the random characters or words employed on each CAPTCHA. As shown in Fig. 3, four kinds 
of CAPTCHAs were deployed to compare the usability of English and Chinese CAPTCHAs: 
Random English Characters (REC), Frequent English Words (FEW), Random Chinese Characters 
(RCC) and Frequent Chinese Words (FCW). Each REC CAPTCHA includes 8 English letters and 
each FEC CAPTCHA includes a single English word that is consisted of 8 letters. The RCC 
CAPTCHA is the counterpart of REC CAPTCHA and it randomly includes 3 or 4 individual 
Chinese characters while the FCW CAPTCHA is the counterpart of FEW CAPTCHA and it 
includes a single Chinese word that is composed of 4 individual Chinese characters. For each 
language, the characters or words used were those frequently used in daily life.  
 
3.4. Experiment II: Evaluation of intrinsic design factors that may affect the usability of 
Chinese CAPTCHAs 
This experiment focused on the unique design factors of Chinese characters, which includes 
different font families, characters that are similar in form or pronunciation, characters of different 
usage frequency, etc. The four fonts studied here were shown in Fig. 4, which are (a) Yahei, (b) 
Songti, (c) Heiti and (d) Caoshu. The first three fonts are widely used in daily lives and have better 
readability comparing with the last one, Caoshu. Among all those fonts, Songti is the slimmest one 
while Heiti is the boldest one. The slimness and boldness of Yahei are in the middle of Songti and 
Heiti but less than Caoshu. 
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Fig. 4. Illustration of Chinese CAPTCHA designs based on four different fonts: (a) Yahei, (b) Songti, (c) Heiti and 
(d) Caoshu. 
 
In addition to the fonts, the other four design factors are as follows: CAPTCHAs based on less 
frequently-used characters and characters with similar appearance are shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b), 
respectively. As discussed before, the input of Chinese relays on Pinyin, which is actually the 
alphabetic coding of a character according to its pronunciation. Generally, the Pinyin of a Chinese 
character includes two parts: initial consonant and simple or compound vowel. However, the 
pronunciation of several pairs of initial consent, “z” and “zh” for example, are similar, which may 
mislead the input of characters that contain those initial consents. It is the same case for simple or 
compound vowels. Therefore, the last two factors focused on the effect of similar pronunciation 
(easily-confused Pinyin): Fig. 5 (c) and Fig. 5 (d) are examples of CAPTCHAs that employ 
characters with similar initial consonants (z/zh, c/ch, s/sh, r/l, l/n, f/h) and similar simple or 
compound vowels (an/ang, en/eng, in/ing), respectively. 
 
Fig. 5. Example of CAPTCHAs based on (a) less-frequent characters [LFC], (b) similar-form characters [SFC], (c) 
characters with similar initial consonants [SIC], and (d) characters with similar simple or compound vowels [SVC]. 
 
 
Ⅳ. Experimental Method 
4.1. Participants 
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Thirty participants (13 males and 17 females), who are native speakers of Chinese with English as 
a familiar second language, were recruited for Experiment I. Their age ranged from 18 to 25 
(M=21.6, SD=1.3) and they were students at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (9 undergraduates 
and 21 graduates) students. All those participants had passed the College English Test Band 6, a 
language proficiency test held by the Ministry of Education of China. Therefore, they were familiar 
with all the English words used in Experiment I. Another 30 participants (14 males and 16 females, 
native speakers of Chinese) were recruited for Experiment II. Their age range from 18 to 25 (M = 
21.4, SD = 2.17) and they were also students at Shanghai Jiao Tong University (16 undergraduates 
and 14 graduates). All participants recruited for both Experiment I and II were experienced 
computer users who spent at least 2 hours per week on word processing with keyboard and mouse 
as the primary input device.  Furthermore, all subjects had encountered English CAPTCHAs and 
Chinese CAPTCHAs during their previous online activities before participating current 
experiments. Also, none of the participants had trouble reading on the screen or operating the 
computer input devices. 
 
 
4.2. Apparatus 
The two experiments were both conducted in a controlled lab environment. All participants were 
instructed to solve CAPTCHAs on a same setup, which included a 20-inch liquid crystal display 
with a resolution of 1440 × 900, a computer running Windows 8.1 system, a set of regular 
QWERTY keyboard and mouse as input devices. Microsoft Pinyin was used for the typing of 
Chinese characters. It is the pre-installed input method of Windows 8.1 and all the participants 
used it in daily lives. Participants were encouraged to comfort themselves by adjusting the tilt 
angle, height of the computer display, as well as the chair positon. All CAPTCHAs were generated 
on a remote server and downloaded in the form of webpages to the local browser, which was 
Google Chrome in this study. After solving CAPTCHAs of each session, each participant was 
required to finish an online questionnaire and interviewed to learn their subjective opinions 
regarding those CAPTCHA designs. 
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4.3. Tasks 
All participants were required to finish three consecutive tasks: Firstly, each participant was 
instructed to solve five test CAPTCHAs to get familiar with the experimental apparatuses. 
Secondly, different types of CAPTCHA design are presented for participants to solve. Each type 
of design used 12 randomly generated CAPTCHAs for averaging. Finally, participants filled in an 
online questionnaire and were interviewed to learn their subjective perceptions on the different 
type of CAPTCHA designs. 
 
4.4. Procedure 
The experiments were carried out in three stages—experiment preparation, testing, and interview. 
During the preparation stage, the apparatuses were reset and each participant was informed with 
the experimental purposes and tasks. All participants were also informed that the test was 
anonymous and any data collected would be restricted for the use of current study only. After that, 
the participant was instructed to get familiar with the experiment apparatuses by means of solving 
five CAPTCHAs that were prepared for testing purpose. During the test session, the participant 
was left alone in the lab and different types of CAPTCHA design are presented one by one through 
the web interface. Each type of design included 12 randomly generated CAPTCHAs and 
participants were instructed to recognize, input and submit the characters shown on a CAPTCHA, 
which simulated the procedure of solving CAPTCHAs that are used by most websites in nowadays. 
After the submission of each CAPTCHA result, a record will be generated on the remote server, 
indexing the solving time, the user input values and whether the CAPTCHA was solved correctly. 
The webpage also refreshed automatically after submission and the participant was directed to 
solve the next CAPTCHA till the end of the task cycle. For each type of CAPTCHA design, 360 
records were collected to obtain the average solving time and correction rate for that type of design. 
After solving all the CAPTCHAs, an online questionnaire was presented for the participant to fill 
in and participants were also interviewed to learn their comments and emotional feelings about 
these different CAPTCHA designs. After that, each participant was paid to appreciate his/her 
cooperation. During the test session, the experiment instructor waited outside the lab all the time 
in case any tech support was need. 
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Ⅴ. Results and Discussion 
5.1. Usability Comparison of English and Chinese CAPTCHAs 
The average solving time and correction rate for all four kinds of CAPTCHA design, which based 
on Random English Characters (REC), Frequent English Words (FEW), Random Chinese 
Characters (RCC), or Frequent Chinese Words (FCW), were illustrated in Fig. 6. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction indicated that the differences of solving 
time were statistically significant [F(2.15, 822.57)=305.44, p<0.001]. 
 
Fig. 6. (a) Average Solving Time and (b) Correct Rate for four kinds of CAPTCHA design: Random English 
Characters (REC), Frequent English Words (FEW), Random Chinese Characters (RCC), Frequent Chinese Words 
(FCW). 
 
The solving time of FEW (M = 4.68s, SD = 1.4s) is essentially the same as that of the FCW (M = 
4.46s, SD = 2.7s). This is attributed to the fact that all participants were familiar with both the 
English and Chinese words used in this study. Therefore, they responded equally fast for 
CAPTCHAs based on words of both languages. It is also indicated in Fig. 6 that, CAPTCHAs 
based on RCC (M = 9.38s, SD = 4s) have the longest solving time, followed by that of REC (M = 
7.75s, SD = 2.3s). Meanwhile, the solving time of both RCC and REC are longer than that of FEC 
and FCC. This is because that, for both languages, it took a longer time for participants to recognize 
and type individually each random character. On the contrary, the characters on a FEC or FCC 
CAPTCHA can be recognized in whole as a meaningful word. Therefore, it took less time to solve 
these two kinds of CAPTCHAs. The similar solving time for both FEC and FCC further shows 
that it took basically the same effort for participants to response to their native language and a 
familiar second language. Those results reveal that CAPTCHAs based on frequently-used English 
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and Chinese words have better efficiency than those employ random characters while there is no 
significant difference in the solving time of frequent English and Chinese words. 
 
The effectiveness of those four CAPTCHA designs are represented by the percentage of 
CAPTCHAs that were correctly solved. As shown in Fig. 6 (b), accuracy for FEW (99.22%), RCC 
(97.66%) and FCW (98.44%) are similar and significantly higher than REC (74.68%). The high 
correct rate for the first three kinds of CAPTCHAs demonstrate that there was no difficulty for 
participants to correctly recognize CAPTCHAs of both languages, which is expected as they were 
bilingual speakers of both English and Chinese. The low correct rate of CAPTCHAs based on 
REC is further explored by individually analyzing the input of each participant. The results turn 
out that, a majority of those incorrect inputs were caused by English letters that look similar, such 
as “I” and “L”. Furthermore, the distortion of those letters, which was aimed at an improved 
security to defense bots, made it even harder for users to distinguish them. When we removed the 
results from CAPTCHAs that contained confusing letters, the accuracy of REC was improved from 
74.48% to 85.31%. However, such an accuracy is still lower than the other three CAPTCHA 
designs. This is further attributed to the random lines, background noises and distortions on a 
CAPTCHA. Although those features are helpful to improve the security of a CAPTCHA, they can 
partially merge or overlap with the candidate English characters and make it confusing to recognize 
letters individually on a REC CAPTCHA. While for FEW CAPTCHAs, even if one or two letters 
of a word were masked, it may still be recognized as a whole and solved correctly to maintain a 
high correct rate of 99.22%. Therefore, FEW design is less sensitive to the security features such 
as random lines or background noises, comparing with that of REC. In addition, due to the 
complexity of Chinese characters, even if a large portion of a Chinese character was masked by 
random lines or background noises, not much difficulty was caused for participants to recognize 
it as a whole and solve it correctly. Briefly, in terms of effectiveness, FEW, RCC and FCW 
CAPTCHAs are similar and much better than REC ones.  
 
In addition to the efficiency and effectiveness studies, each participant was also instructed to finish 
a questionnaire and interviewed to acquire their subjective opinions toward those four types of 
CAPTCHA designs. The satisfactory questionnaire, which used the 5-point Likert-scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree), focused on the following three aspects: Q1. It is visually 
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comfortable; Q2. It’s easy and efficient to recognize and input; Q3. It’s appropriate for wide 
application.  Those questionnaire results are displayed in Table 1. Friedman tests prove statistical 
differences in visual comfort (Q1, χ2(2)=79.06, p<0.001), ease of use (Q2, χ2(2)=77.27, p<0.001), 
and appropriateness for application (Q3, χ2(2)=75.84, p<0.001). 
 
Table 1. Satisfaction of CAPTCHAs based on Random English Characters (REC), Frequent English Words (FEW), 
Random Chinese Characters (RCC), Frequent Chinese Words (FCW). The questionnaire uses a 5-point Likert-scale 
(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). 
 
REC  FEW  RCC  FCW  
AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  
 Q1. It’s visually 
comfortable 
3.03 1.13  4.13 0.78  2.87 1.17  4.13 0.78  
 Q2. It’s easy and efficient 
to recognize and input 
2.93 1.20  4.60 0.50  2.53 1.22   4.40 0.72  
 Q3. It’s appropriate for 
wide application 
2.63 1.13  4.50 0.86  2.07 1.23          4.20 0.87  
 
The results indicate that FEW and FCW were the most preferred CAPTCHAs, while REC and 
RCC were negatively rated. The face-to-face interview further revealed that, more than 97.3% of 
the participants believed it was easy to recognize FEW and FCW CAPTCHAs with just a single 
glance. On the contrary, for CAPTCHAs based on random characters, it took more efforts to 
recognize each character individually. The portion of participants who were in favor of 
CAPTCHAs based on English or Chinese are 56.07% or 43.3%, respectively. Those who preferred 
English words felt it was more natural and straightforward to type English words because they did 
not need to switch the input method between English and Chinese. For those who preferred 
CAPTCHAs based on Chinese words, they felt more comfortable with native language and the 
Pinyin input methods in nowadays are well engineered to provide a fast input of Chinese. Although 
more than 78% of the participants believed that CAPTCHAs based on random Chinese characters 
provided the most security, there were hardly any participant who was willing to encounter such 
type of CAPTCHAs. 
 
5.2. Intrinsic design factors that may affect the usability of Chinese CAPTCHA 
Experiment I indicated that, for native speakers, the usability of Chinese CAPTCHAs could be the 
same as those English ones in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfactory. Therefore, we 
further explored the design factors that may affect the usability of those Chinese CAPTCHAs. 
However, we mainly focused on the intrinsic factors imposed only on Chinese characters rather 
than external factors such as background noises, strikethrough lines, or distortions, etc., which had 
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been extensively studied in previous publications, like [5, 8]. Also, each Chinse CAPTCHA 
studied in Experiment II contained two random words and each word was consisted of two 
individual Chinese characters. This is a compromise between usability and security: Random 
Chinese characters boost the highest security but less preferred by users; A word contains four 
individual Chinese characters is easier for users while less secure.  
 
 
Fig. 7. (a) Solving time and (b) correction rate of CAPTCHAs based on four different fonts: Yahei, Songti, Heiti and 
Caoshu. 
 
The solving time and correction rate for the four different fonts, Yahei, Songti, Heiti and Caoshu, 
were introduced in Fig. 7. A repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
indicated that the differences of solving time are statistically significant [F(2.45, 
377.42)=20.53, p< 0.001]. The solving time of Yahei (M = 6.97s, SD =3.01s), Songti (M = 6.11s, 
SD =2.11s), and Heiti (M = 6.46s, SD =3.04s) are similar while short than that of Caoshu 
(M=8.74s, SD =4.69s). The correction rate of Yahei (97.40%), Songti (96.75), and Heiti (98.05%) 
are also similar while higher than that of Caoshu (93.5%). Those results indicate that the efficiency 
and effectiveness were the same for the first three fonts and better than that of Caoshu.  Because 
the most prominent difference between the first three fonts is the boldness of the character, this 
indicates that the usability of Chinese CAPTCHA is insensitive to the thickness of characters. Due 
to the lower readability of Caoshu, which is the counterpart of German Script fonts for English, 
the solving time and correction rate of Caoshu are longer and lower, respectively, comparing with 
the rest three fonts. The results of Yahei is chosen as the reference group because it was the default 
font used for the evaluation of all other Chinese CAPTCHA designs, which were shown in Fig. 6 
and Fig. 8. The solving time of Yahei (M=6.97s, SD=3.01s) is between that of FCW and RCC in 
Fig. 6. This agrees with the fact that, to balance between usability and security, each CAPTCHA 
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studied in Experiment II contains two random Chinese words and therefore the complexity of such 
CAPTCHAs is in between that of the FCW and RCC ones in Fig. 6.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Solving time and correct rate of Chinese CAPTCHAs based on (a) low frequency characters [LFC], (b) 
similar form characters [SFC], (c) similar initial consonant characters [SIC] and (d) similar vowel characters [SVC]. 
 
In addition to font, the other four factors explored in Experiment II were shown in Fig. 8. A 
repeated measures ANOVA indicated that the differences of the solving times among the four 
factors and the reference group (Yahei shown in Fig. 7) were statistically significant [F(2.08, 
317.6)=28.58, p<0.001)]. For CAPTCHAs employed low-frequency characters (LFC), the solving 
time (M=10.19s, SD=7.77s) and correction rate (91.61%) is longer and lower comparing with that 
of the reference group, Yahei in Fig. 7, respectively. This reveals that, CAPTCHAs based on 
unfrequently used characters have lower usability in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. For 
CAPTCHAs based on similar-form characters (SFC), there were at least two characters looked 
similar. The solving time (M=6.69s, SD=2.57s) and correct rate (98.10%) of SFC have no much 
difference with respect to the reference group of Yahei in Fig. 7. This means that, even if the 
candidate characters shown on a CAPTCHAs look similar, no notable confusion or difficulties 
would be imposed on the solving effort. The last two factors focused on the characters that have 
similar pronunciation. As discussed before, the most popular means of typing Chinese is Pinyin, 
which is an alphabetic coding of each character according to its pronunciation. Therefore, if the 
pronunciation of two candidate characters are similar, their correspondent Pinyin would also be 
similar, which may affect the solving of a CAPTCHA. Given that the Pinyin of a character is 
usually composed of two parts: the initial consonants and the simple or compound vowels, the last 
two factors mainly focus on the CAPTCHAs that contain similar initial consonant characters [SIC] 
or similar vowel characters [SVC].  For SIC CAPTCHAs, the solving time (M=5.82s, SD=2.60s) 
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and accuracy (98.71%) are similar with that of the reference group of Yahei in Fig. 7.  However, 
for SVC CAPTCHAs, the solving time (M=9.34s, SD=5.05s) is slightly longer than the reference 
group of Yahei in Fig. 7. This implies that the participants had been confused to some extent and 
it took longer time to figure out the correct vowels. However, the accuracy remains high (98.70%), 
which is because the participants were familiar with the appearance of the characters and therefore 
could recognize the characters correctly. 
 
During Experiment II, participants were also interviewed and presented with a questionnaire to 
learn their subjective opinion about those intrinsic design factors of Chinese CAPTCHAs. The 
satisfactory questionnaire utilized the 5-point Likert-scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) 
and focused on three aspects: Q1. It is visually comfortable; Q2. It’s easy and efficient to recognize 
and input; Q3. It’s appropriate for wide application. Those questionnaire results are displayed in 
Table 2 and 3. Friedman test results are listed in Table 4, which reveal statistically significant 
differences between those variables. 
 
Table 2. Satisfaction of Chinese CAPTCHAs based on four different fonts: Yahei, Songti, Heiti and Caoshu. The 
questionnaire used a 5-point Likert-scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). 
 
 
Yahei  Songti  Heiti  Caoshu  
AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  
Q1. It’s visually 
comfortable 
 4.43 0.86  4.10 0.99  4.40 0.81  2.60 0.93  
Q2. It’s easy and efficient 
to recognize and input 
4.43 0.90  4.23 0.97  4.47 0.90  2.83 1.23  
Q3. It’s appropriate for 
wide application 
4.10 0.82  4.10 0.92  4.40 0.86  2.43 0.86  
 
Table 3. Satisfaction of Chinese CAPTCHAs based on low frequency characters [LFC], similar form characters 
[SFC], similar initial consonant characters [SIC] and similar vowel characters [SVC]. The questionnaire used a 5-
point Likert-scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). 
 
 
LFC   CFS  SIC  SVC  
AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  AVG SD  
 Q1. It’s visually comfortable 3.53 1.14  3.97 1.03  4.20 1.00  4.17 0.95  
 Q2. It’s easy and efficient to 
recognize and input 
2.93 0.91  4.06 0.94  3.90 0.99  3.53 1.04  
 Q3. It’s appropriate for wide 
application 
2.77 0.97  3.90 0.84  3.87 0.94  3.5 1.00  
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Table 4. Friedman test results for the variables listed in Table 2 and 3, which indicate statistical differences  
 
Yahei, Songti, Heiti, Caoshu  Yahei, LFC, SFC, SIC, SVC  
 Chi-square Asymp.Sig.  Chi-square Asymp.Sig.  
Q1. It’s visually comfortable 77.77 p<0.001  60.13 p<0.001  
Q2. It’s easy and efficient to 
recognize and input 
70.93 p<0.001  86.19 p<0.001  
Q3. It’s appropriate for wide 
application 
77.10 p<0.001  92.05 p<0.001  
 
Among all the four fonts, participants were satisfied with Yahei, Songti and Heiti. The font Caoshu, 
which is relatively harder to recognize, was not preferred. In addition, CAPTCHAs that contained 
less-frequently or similar form characters also turned out to be less favored. Although participants 
reported that characters with similar pronunciations are visually comfortable, they believed that 
CATPCHAs based on those characters were less efficient. This is probably because that it takes 
extra efforts to distinguish the similar pronunciations during the typing of those characters  
 
5.3. Procedure for the localization of text CAPTCHAs 
The localization study of Chinese CAPTCHAs presented here is expected to be capable of 
generalizing to many other languages, such as Arabic, Japanese, Korean, Indian, Russian, etc. Fig. 
9 shows the general procedure we proposed for the localization of text CAPTCHAs, which consists 
of three consecutive steps: (i) Comparing the usability of CPATCHAs based on English and local 
language; (ii) Evaluating the design factors that may affect the usability of localized CAPTCHAs; 
(iii) Refining CAPTCHA designs according to security analysis and medium scale user test. 
 
The goal of the first step is to determine if CAPTCHAs based on local language is comparable or 
better than English ones. During this stage, the first thing is to analyze the cognition processes of 
solving CAPTCHAs that employ local language and English. According to those results, a design 
matrix is generated to help prepare English and local CAPTCHAs within a similar frame for the 
comparison of usability. For example, selection of fonts that support both languages and are 
equally popular for local users; determination of the candidate texts such as random characters or 
frequently-used words, etc. Thereafter, native speakers of local language who are also familiar 
with English are recruited to participant in the usability test. Because those bilingual participants 
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are familiar with both the English and local characters presented on a CAPTCHA, the intrinsic 
usability difference between those two languages is evaluated within a similar frame in which the 
user difference is minimized. For native speakers who are unfamiliar with English, their 
performance on English CAPTCHA is expected to be lower than those who know English, as is 
the case for Urdu, the local language in Indian[13]. As a consequence, if the usability test indicates 
that bilingual participants perform equally or better with local language CAPTCHAs, then it is 
worthy to localize those CAPTCHAs based on that local language. Otherwise, it is suggested to 
use English CAPTCHAs.  
 
If CAPTCHAs based on local language provide equal or better usability than English ones, then it 
is time to move to the next step: evaluating the design factors that may affect the usability of a 
localized CAPTCHA. Those design factors are classified into two categories: intrinsic factors and 
general factors. The intrinsic factors are defined as those uniquely related with a particular 
language, for example, similarity of characters in form or pronunciation, typical font families, etc. 
All other design factors are classified as general factors, which can be applied to all languages, 
such as background noise, distortion, overlapping, rotation angle, etc. This study mainly evaluated 
the intrinsic factors, because the results of Experiment I preliminarily showed that Chinese 
CAPTCHAs are not significantly affected by general factors like background noise, distortion etc. 
However, for the full process of CAPTCHA localization, it is recommended to evaluate both the 
intrinsic and general factors. During the last setup, security evaluation and medium-scale user test 
are suggested to further polish the design of localized CAPTCHAs, followed by the actual 
deployment. 
 - 19 - 
 
 
Fig. 9. Procedure for the localization of text CAPTCHAs 
 
 
Ⅵ. Conclusion 
In this study, we analyzed the cognition processes of solving English and Chinese CAPTCHAs, 
compared the usability of CAPTCHAs based on the two languages, evaluated the intrinsic factors 
that may affect the usability of Chinese CAPTCHAs, and finally proposed a procedure that is 
applicable for the design of user-friendly CAPTCHAs based on other languages. Although the 
cognition process of solving Chinese CAPTCHAs involves more efforts due to its less 
straightforward input method than that of English, the usability comparison experiments indicated 
that CAPTCHAs based on the two languages are almost equally usable within the same design 
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factors such as font size and family, distortion, background noise level and typing workload. This 
is mainly attributed to the fact that native speakers are skillful in typing Chinese Characters. 
Further analyses on intrinsic design factors of Chinese CAPTCHAs revealed that, the usability of 
those CAPTCHAs is less sensitive to the daily-used fonts such as Yahei, Songti or Heiti. 
Meanwhile, although the characters that are similar in form didn’t affect the usability, characters 
that are similar in pronunciation may bring confusions to the solving of such CAPTCHAs because 
it affects the input of those characters. Basing on the comprehensive evaluation on the localization 
of CAPTCHAs employing Chinese characters, a generalized procedure for the localization 
practice of other languages was proposed, which includes three steps: usability comparison 
between alphanumeric and local-language CAPTCHAs, evaluating design factors that may affect 
the usability of local language CPATCHAs, medium scale deployment for feedback and final 
deployment of localized CAPTCHAs. This study may shine a light for designing user-friendly 
CAPTCHAs that employ local languages. 
 
Limitations of this study and future work 
The limitation of this study falls into the following aspects: The current study mainly focused on 
the usability while the security of localized CAPTCHAs is not thoroughly discussed. We’ve 
utilized commercial optical character recognize (OCR) software to preliminarily test all the 
CAPTCHAs mentioned in this study and found that those based on Chinese characters were 
securer than alphanumeric ones. However, in real case, the hack of CAPTCHAs usually includes 
two consecutive processes, segmentation and recognition [5, 23], which are dedicated to the 
recognition of distorted characters with background noises [24, 25]. A comprehensive study on 
the security aspect of Chinese CAPTCHAs with different design factors would be an interesting 
topic in the future. Another limitation is the scale of the usability test. However, with the rapid 
development of Amazon Mechanical Turk [26], it is possible to deploy Chinese CAPTCHA 
designs for large scale evaluations, which is expected to provide more specific results, such as how 
users of different experience with computers would response to those CAPTCHAs; how people of 
different ages may perform, etc. Moreover, design factors that are not thoroughly discussed in this 
study, distortion or background noise for example, could be investigated in detail with such large 
scale test. Also, the CAPTCHAs studied here is not deployed in real-life situations, such as 
registrations for an online account or login of Email systems. On possible solution is to incorporate 
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such tests into a real life situation. For example, previous studies have shown the advantages of 
integrating usability test of CAPTCHAs into real-life system that is design for online courses [27]. 
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